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Abstract
I study the relationship between income inequality and public intervention in
education in a voting model. Traditional Political Economy models typically
imply a strong relationship between income inequality and public intervention
in redistributive policies. Empirical evidence suggests that this may hold true
only for certain kinds of policies, e.g. cash transfers, but it may not hold true
in the case of social security and education policies. I propose a method to
study this relationship in the case in which forms of redistribution other than
the public provision of education are available to voters. Moreover, I allow
consumers to opt-out of the public education system and get private education.
This assumption implies that individual preferences may exhibit non-convexities
and therefore the equilibrium may not be unique.
I show that the relationship between income inequality and governmental
intervention implied in the traditional literature is mainly a result of excessively
restrictive assumptions. In particular, in a political equilibrium income inequal-
ity negatively affects public investment in education if the latter tends to reduce
future inequality. This is consistent with the results in the empirical literature
about public investment in education.
Keywords: Political Economy, Probabilistic models, public provision, income
inequality
1. Introduction
The relationship between the degree of governmental intervention in redis-
tributive policies and the features of the population in democratic political sys-
tems has been a major topic of research in Political Economy for over 50 years.
Despite of the remarkable research effort and the large literature produced the
existing theoretical models are not suitable to explain some of the patterns of
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2governmental intervention described in the empirical literature in the field and
in particular the one that is the object of this paper, namely the relationship
between income inequality and degree of public intervention in the provision of
certain goods, such as public education.
Traditional models imply a strong relationship between these two variables,
and this is an implication that is directly related to the redistributive effects1 of
the public provision; more specifically if the public provision is uniform and it
is financed through a progressive income tax, then the typical implication is a
positive effect of a rise in income inequality2 on the degree of public intervention.
Empirical evidence suggests that this relationship may hold true only for
certain kinds of policies, for instance cash transfers or education, but in the
case of other policies with redistributive effects such as social security and some
publicly provided private goods it may not hold true. In particular while there is
some evidence about a positive relationship between governmental spending in
schooling and income inequality (see Easterly and Rebelo, 1993 and Sylwester,
2000) this relationship does not seem to emerge about the provision of other
goods such as Health Care.
A second, perhaps more foundamental puzzle that emerge from the tradi-
tional models is that they typically imply a positive level of public provision for
pure private goods, which is something that it is inconsistent with facts about
governmental intervention in democratic countries.
In this paper I aim to show the theoretical issues that make traditional
models unsuitable for addressing this problem and I propose an alternative
framework that may help to shed light on what really drives the realtionship of
interest.
The main result is a method that allows me to derive direction of the effect
of a marginal increase in income inequality on the equilibrium level of public
provision of a private good with peculiar characteristics in a Probabilistic Voting
Model, and the use of this method in order to show two important results.
The first result is that some of the predictions of the traditional models are
mainly due to excessively burdensome assumptions and will not survive in less
restrictive models. The second result is that the way in which the good is pro-
vided may play a crucial role in determining the direction of the relationship of
interest, and this finding makes the model useful to describe the peculiar pat-
terns of public intervention in education. More specifically I focus on the effects
of the presence of private alternatives to public education and the possibility
of opting out of the public sector. My findings suggest that public intervention
in education may be affected by income inequality not because of the charac-
teristics that this policy shares with other governmental policies (redistributive
effects) but because of its peculiarities in the way in which the provision is
1Given that we are interested in in-kind policies the concept of redistributive effects has
to be properly defined. See section 2.
2More precisely, of a specific feature of the income distribution that is typically the distance
between mean and median income.
3delivered.
Finally I provide an example of an an application of the tool developed in
this paper that can be particulary promising: a model of parental investment in
education. This is interesting because it potentially provides a testable impli-
cation for the mechanism that underpins the comparative statics in my model.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 I describe the findings of the
empirical literature about public provision of Education and income inequality
and in section 3 I explain why the traditional theoretical literature in the field
is not suitable to explain some of these fact. In section 4 I describe a Proba-
bilisting Model of Voting and I propose a tool that allows me to study the sign
of the relationship between the equilibrium level of public provision of a good
of interest and the degree of income inequality in the population of voters. In
section 5 I show why this relationship is crucially driven by the way in which
the public provision is delivered, and I argue that this finding has interesting
consequences in the study of the relationship between income inequality and
public intervention in education. In section 6 I provide some comments about
the potential of these finding for future research and about the limits of this
approach.
2. Facts
There is a large empirical literature about the relationship between income
inequality and governmental spending in redistributive policies (see de Mello,
Tiongson 2006 for a review of this literature). On the contrary the amount of
research about the relationship between income inequality and the degree of
public intervention in specific in-kind policies (and Education in particular) is
very limited. There is evidence of positive correlation between income inequal-
ity and public intervention in schooling, but it is hard to establish a causal
relationship between these two variables. The reason is that the relationship
is potentially endogenous because of reverse cuasality; on one hand Political
Economy models suggest that income inequality may affect the degree of public
intervention in certain policies, but on the other hand it is likely that Public
investment in Education induces a fall in the degree of future income inequality
(see for instance Sylwester, 2002). Figure 1 shows the correlation between the
pre-tax Gini index of income inequality in 2010 and the public expenditure per
capita in education in the 50 U.S. States (2011).
4Easterly and Rebelo (1993) unsing cross section data show that high level
income inequality tend to be associated with future high level of public spending
in education. Sylwester (2000) also finds a weak but significant positive corre-
lation between income inequality and future public spending in education, even
if the issue of reverse causality in the relationship is not completely addressed
in his paper.
Despite of these issues is interesting to notice that if the existence of a non-
positive impact of public education on income inequality is a theoretically and
empirically robust channel that relates the two variables, then the fact that
the two variables are positively correlated suggest that there may be a non
negligible positive effect in the opposite direction of causality (even if other
sources of endogeneity may affect this hypotesis).
In strong contrast with these facts, there is little evidence of any relationship
between other forms of public provision and income inequality and the relation-
ship between income inequality and transfers seems to be null or negative (see
Bassett et al., 1999).
This implies that a model that aims to succesfully explain these facts must
allow the researcher to separate the effects of governmental intervention in edu-
cation from the ones of other source of public spending and must provide some
theoretical reason for the different effects of income inequality on different public
spending variables.
In the next section I will explain why traditional models are not suitable to
address this question.
3. Downsian Models
The seminal works of Black (1948) and Downs (1957) provides a framework
that allows to analyze problems of Political Economy that have public inter-
vention in spending policies as object. One of the main advantages of their
approach is that it delivers a characterization for the outcome of the political
interaction that is very attractive both for its ease of interpretation (Majority
Voting Equilibrium) and for its immediate and sharp implications in terms of
5social choice and comparative statics (the Median Voter Theorem). In the so-
called Downsian models the socially preferred policy in equilibrium is the the
one that maximizes the objective function of the Median Voter, therefore it is
sufficient to analyze the choice of one specific individual in order to characterize
the social choice (see AppendixA for an example).
The use of Downsian models to study the patterns of public intervention in
specific policies such as the public provision of private goods had to face impor-
tant theoretical issues due to the different ways in which the provision of this
kind of goods can be carried out (see Stiglitz, 1974) but it proved successful in
characterizing a Political equilibrium based on the concept of Pivotal Voter (see
for instance Epple and Romano 1996a, 1996b and Gouveia, 1997). Therefore
these models share the same interpretative advantages of the original model
proposed by Downs but they do not always deliver similar sharp predictions
about the comparative statics of interest.
Despite of the positive features listed above and the success in the traditional
literature in Political Economy, I claim that this kind of models is not suitable
the analysis of the relationship between income inequality and the degree of
public intervention in imperfect public goods or private goods with externalities.
In order to understand why this is the case it may be useful to recall that
the existence of a Majority Voting equilibrium relies on two main assumptions:
the first is that the policy space is restricted to a single dimension (i); the
second is that voters’ preferences satisfy the Spence-Mirrlees condition3 in a
unidimensional parameter (ii); it is also important to underline that the outcome
of these models in equilibrium is characterized as the policy that is preferred by
a single individual (Pivotal Voter) (iii).
Assumpion (i) implies that the public provision is the only channel through
which redistribution can be achieved, hence these models imply that pure private
goods should be publicly provided in equilibrium (see Usher, 1977); assumption
(ii) implies that the equilibrium social choice depends uniquely on the distri-
bution of this parameter and this generates a strong relationship between some
feature of the distribution and the degree of public intervention in equilibrium.
In the analysis of the effects of political interaction on public spending policies
the natural choice for this parameter is some measure of income or earnings (see
Usher 1977, Epple and Romano 1996a, 1996b). Finally result (iii) implies that
the effects of a change in the policy on any voter but the Pivotal one do not
affect the equilibrium outcome.
The analysis suggests that in Downsian models the strong relationship be-
tween the degree of income inequality among voters and the degree of govern-
mental intervention in policies with redistributive effects is equivalent to the
demand for public intervention of a single individual; in the analysis of pub-
lic provision of private goods This means that the comparative statics of these
models is equivalent to the change in the demand for the good of this specific
3Some papers the more general Single Crossing Property. The relationship between The
S-M condition and SCP is described in Migrom, Shannon (1994).
6individual induced by changes in income and in the tax-price of the good4. This
implies in turn that goods that have similar feature in terms of demand on the
private market should be characterized by similar patterns in the public pro-
vision, and that if the tax system is progressive enough the effect of income
inequality on publicly provided private goods should be generally positive re-
gardless of the features of the good (see AppendixB for an example).
Empirical evidence suggests that this may not be true, for instance the
public provisions of Health Care and public goods seem to exhibit very different
patterns in comparison with public education 5.
In order to solve this problem it is necessary to analyze the choice of voters
in a multidimensional policy space in which at least another (possibly pure) re-
distributive variable is available to voters (for instance a uniform in-cash grant)
such that the social demand for redistribution and for public intervention in
a specific in-kind public provision can be disentangled. Moreover it would be
desirable to develop a model in which the effects of a policy on all voters con-
tribute in determining the political outcome, because the role of the Pivotal
Voter in the traditional models is the result of an unrealistic description of the
political process that may affect (and I claim in a decisive way in section 4) the
comparative statics of interest. Unfortunately these two requirements cannot be
achieved in the traditional framework because the unidimensionality assump-
tion is essential for the existence of a Majority Voting equilibrium in Downsian
Models6, and because the deterministic nature of voting in these models implies
that only ordinal factors matter (i.e. if for an individual i xA  xB , he will
vote for candidate A with probability 1, independent of the intensity of this
preference).
The literature in Political Economy accounts for different classes of model
that provide one or both these desirable features. Citizen-candidate models
(Besley and Coates, 1991, 1997) allow for a multidimensional policy space but
their equilibrium outcomes depend on few individuals; more generally they are
not suitable for studying the problem of interest because they do not usually
deliver sharp prediction about the policy that should be chosen by a certain
community. This is due to the multiplicity of equilibria that is a usual outcome
in this models. More recent equilibium concepts such as the Party Unanimity
Nash Equilibrium (Roemer, 1999) or the one in Levy (2005) meet both the
requirements, but they are also not useful because of the same multiplicity issue
and for the lack of a useful characterization of the policy chosen in equilibrium.
The choice of a Probabilistic Model relies on two appealing features of this
kind of models: on one hand they meet the two requirments described above,
on the other hand they imply a unique equilibrium under assumptions that are
relatively mild and easy to impose and the equilibrium consists of a single chosen
4Defined as total taxes paid by the individual divided by the size of the public provision.
5For a review of the empirical literature about the relationship between income inequality
and public spending see De Mello, Tiongson (2006)
6see Grandmond (1978) and Plott (1967) for an analysis of the effects of multidimension-
ality in Downsian models
7policy. The main shortcoming in the use of this class of models in analysing
problems similar to the one that is the object of this paper is the lack of analitical
tools to study the effects of changes in the distribution of voter’s characteristics
and the policy chosen in equilibrium. The development of one of these tools is
one of the main contributions of this paper. In the next section I propose a two-
candidates Probabilistic Voting model in which individuals differ in one single
observable dimension (income) and can vote over a multidimensional policy
space and I derive the comparative statics induced by a marginal increase in
the variance of the income distribution keeping the mean constant (i.e. the
effect of a marginal mean preserving spread).
4. A Probabilistic Voting Model with Convex Utility
In this section I will present a relatively simple model of Probabilistic Voting
that is substantially similar to the ones of this kind in the literature such as the
one proposed by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), Enelow and Heinrich (1989),
Banks and Duggan (2004). The key feature of this models is that the vote of
every individual (and therefore the outcome of the election) is not determinis-
tic. This assumption eases dramatically the conditions for the existence of a
Political Equilibrium when the policy space is multidimensional in comparison
with Downsian models.
The price to pay is that we cannot obtain a simple characterization of the
equilibrium outcomes and that there are very little results about the compara-
tive statics in these models.
In the next section I will provide sufficient conditions for existence and
uniqueness of a political equilibrium, while in section 4.2 I will propose a method
to study the comparative statics induced by a marginal mean-preserving spread
in the income distribution.
4.1. Existence and Uniqueness
In this section I will describe the model and I will state results of existence
and uniqueness of the political equilibrium wich are minor modifications of the
ones in Banks, Duggan (2005) and Enelow, Hinich (1989).
The consumer-voters differ from each other only in a unidimensional param-
eter t ∈ T that is continuously distributed with c.d.f. G(t).
A feasible policy is a vector x ∈ X where X := {x|x ∈ Rn+ ∩ C(x,G(t)) ≤ 0}
is a convex set and C(x,G(t)) ≤ 0 is the governmental budget constraint.
There are 2 parties: A and B. Before the election the two parties simulta-
neously choose a feasible policy xA and xB , respectively.
A voters supports party A if v(xA, t)− v(xB , t) +  ≥ 0 where v(x, t) is the
indirect utility induced by policy x to an individual with parameter t and  is a
parameter unobserved by the parties that captures the idiosincratic preference
of an individual for party A. Assume  is i.i.d. across voters. then we can
define the probability that an individual with parameter t votes for party A
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given policies xA, xB as
Pr
(
 ≤ v(xA, t)− v(xB , t)) = P(v(xA, t)− v(xB , t))
where P(·) is an increasing C2 function. The probability that an individ-
ual with parameter t votes for party B given policies xA, xB is simply 1 −
P (v(xA, t)− v(xB , t)). Therefore the expected plurality for partyA from propos-
ing policy xA given the policy proposed by party B is given by:
V A(xA, xB) ≡ Et[P(v(xA, t)− v(xB , t))] =
tˆ
t
[P(v(xA, t)− v(xB , t))]g(t)dt
And streightforwardly the expected plurality for party B is V B(xA, xB) =
1− V A(xA, xB).
Each party maximizes the expected number of votes7. Therefore the best
response for party A to policy xBproposed by party B is a policy xABR such
that:
xABR ≡ arg max
x∈X
V A(x, xB)
This setting is relatively standard and because of that some results in Enelow,
Hinich (1989) and Banks, Duggan (2004) hold with minor adjustments. I am
going restate these results for this specific setting.
Theorem 1. (Mixed strategies equilibria) Assume (i) X is compact and (ii) for
each t, P(v(xA, t)−v(xB , t)) is jointly continuous in (xA, xB). Then there exists
a mixed strategy electoral equilibrium of the electoral game.
Proof. See Banks, Duggan (2004).
I prove that condition (i) and (ii) are satisfied under the assumptions of the
model.
(i) Compactness. Using the definition the definition of the policy space in
our paper X is a closed and bounded subset of Rn+, hence it is a compact set.
(ii) Joint continuity. This holds for this objective function.
Proof. Define Y = X×X, v˜C : Y → R such that y = (xA, xB)⇒ v˜C(y, t) =
v(xC , t) for i = A,B.
Suppose v˜C : Y → R are all continuous maps. Then, the map hi : Y → R
given by hC(y, t) = PC(v˜A(y, t), v˜B(y, t)) is a jointly continuous map.
Similarly, the expectation is a continuous map of hC(y, t) for ∀t ∈ T to R.
Hence V C(xA, xB) is jointly continuous in (xA, xB). Q.E.D.
Theorem 2. (Pure strategy equilibria) Assume (i) X is compact and convex,
(ii) for each t, P(v(xA, t)− v(xB , t)) is jointly continuous in (xA, xB), (iii) for
each (xA, xB), V A(xA, xB) is quasi-concave in xA and V B(xA, xB) is quasi-
concave in xB. Then there exist a pure strategy electoral equilibrium.
7Aranson, Hinich and Ordeshook (1974) have shown that in Probabilistic Voting models
this is equivalent to maximize the expected plurality and, as the number of voters approaches
infinity, it is also equivalent to maximize the probability of winning the elections.
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Proof. See Banks, Duggan (2004).
(i) Compactness. Same as in Theorem 1. Convexity. The space of mixed
strategies for the candidates is convex if the governmental budget set is a convex
set.
(ii) Joint continuity. Same as in Theorem 1.
(iii) Quasi-concavity. We will verify conditions for concavity, which implies
the condition required. Theorem 3 establish sufficient conditions for concavity
to hold.
Define V (x, xB) as above, dA(x, t) ≡ v(x, t) − v(xB , t), Hv is the Hessian
matrix of v(x, t), i.e. Hijv =
∂2v(x,t)
∂xi∂xj
.
Theorem 3. (Existence). Assume P(·) and v(x, t) are C2 functions in their
domains. Then there xists a pure strategy electoral equilibrium if (i)V A(x, xB)
is concave in x if for any x ∈ X and (ii) for any vector y ∈ Rn the following
condition holds:ˆ
T
(
p′(dA(x, t))
[
yT∇v(x, t)]2 + pA(dA(x, t))yTHvy) g(t)dt ≤ 0
A similarly condition can be derived for concavity of V B(xA, x) in x.
Proof. See Enelow, Hinich (1989).
Notice that this condition implies that as long as v(x, t) is strictly concave
in x, a sufficient condition for this to hold is
p′(dA(x, t))
p(dA(x, t))
≤ −yTHvy
[
yT∇v(x, t)]−2
i.e. the probability distribution P must be sufficiently “flat”8.
Theorem 4. (Uniqueness). Assume (i) X is compact and convex, (ii) for each
t, P(v(xA, t)−v(xB , t)) is jointly continuous in (xA, xB), (iii) for each (xA, xB),
V A(xA, xB) is strictly concave in xA and V B(xA, xB) is strictly concave in xB.
Then there is exactly one electoral equilibrium, and it is in pure strategies.
(i) Compactness. Same as in Theorem 3. Convexity. In out problem is
satisfied if and only if the Governmental Budget set C(x,G(t)) ≤ 0 is a convex
set. In problems with non-linear budget sets this conditions may fail to apply
(see next sections).
(ii) Joint continuity. Same as in Theorem 1.
(iii) Strict concavity. Conditions are the same as in Theorem 3, except that
we need to verify the negative definitiveness of the Hessian Matrix.
Theorem 5. (Policy convergence): under assumptions (i), (ii), (iii) of Theo-
rem 4, the unique electoral equilibrium is such that the two parties choose the
same policy.
8See Enelow, Hinich (1989) for an example of how this condition simplifies under specific
parametric assumptions.
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Proof. See AppendixC.3.
Theorem 6. (Utilitarian outcome): if all individuals have the same Party pref-
erence distribution, i.e. P(·, t) = P(·)∀t then the policy chosen by both parties
in equilibrium is the same as the policy that would be chosen by an omnipotent
Benthamite government, i.e. the policy that maximizes the Utilitarian Social
Welfare function.
Proof. See AppendixC.4.
4.2. Main result
In this section I describe the way in which a change in income inequality
is defined in this paper. I will use the concept of Mean Preserving Spread,
i.e. a distribution G(t) is a MPS of F (t) if and only if EG(t) = EF (t) and
V ARG(t) > V ARF (t). Notice how this concept is much more general and easy
to interpret in comparison with the distance between mean and median that
typically drives the comparative statics in Downsian models.
Mean preserving spread are imposed as follows: F (t), G(t) are two c.d.f.s
such that
´ t
t
[G(t)− F (t)] dt ≥ 0 for all t ≤ t (i.e. F (t) Second Order Stochas-
tically Dominates G(t) ), and
´ t
t
[G(t)− F (t)] dt = 0 (i.e. G(t) is a mean pre-
serving spread of F (t)). Define:
r(t, θ) ≡ f(t) + θ [g(t)− f(t)]
where f(t), g(t) are the p.d.f.s of F (t) and G(t). Notice that r(t, θ) is a
Mean Preserving Spread of f(t) for all θ.
tˆ
t
tr(t, θ)dt = (1− θ)
tˆ
t
tf(t)dt+ θ
tˆ
t
tg(t)dt = E(t)
Moreover, the effect of moving θ in a neighborhood of θ = 0 corresponds
to the effect of increasing Income Inequality keeping the mean constant. Hence
the derivative of the equilibrium value of a choice variable with respect to θ
corresponds to the comparative statics of interest.
4.2.1. Comparative statics
Assume that the conditions of Theorem 4 are satisfied, and that C(x,R(t, θ))
is an increasing and convex C2 function. Then Theorem 6 can be used to
derive the comparative statics induced by an increase in income inequality. In
particular, given that the political equilibrium is the same as the Utilitarian
outcome, the comparative statics will also be the same. Hence I will study the
simpler problem:
max
C(x,R(t,θ))≤0
tˆ
t
v(x, t)r(t, θ)dt (1)
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The Lagrangean of this problem is:
L =
tˆ
t
v(x, t)r(t, θ)dt− λC(x,R(t, θ))
Given that the objective function is strictly convex and the budget set is
compact the solution is internal. The First Order Conditions are:
Li =
tˆ
t
vi(x, t)r(t, θ)dt− λC(x,R(t, θ)) = 0 ∀i
Lλ = C(x,R(t, θ)) = 0
Differentiate F.O.C.s w.r.t. θ and evaluate them at θ = 0 to get∑
j
Lij
∂xj(0)
∂θ
+ Liλ ∂λ
∂θ
+ Liθ = 0 ∀i (2)
This will give a sistem of n + 1 equations and n + 1unknown that can be
solved using the Cramer’s rule, giving:
∂xi(0)
∂θ
= −det
[
N i(L, θ)
]
det [D2(L)]
∀i
where N i = (n + 1 × n + 1) is a transformation of D2(L) in which the ith
column of D2(L) is replaced with ∇Lθ, which is the (n+1×1) vector such that
∇ (Lθ)i = Liθ. We need to impose some more restrictions in order to derive
the sign of the derivative of interest. Different assumption may deliver a useful
characterisation of the comparative statics and may be more or less restrictive
depending on the specific problem of interest. In the next section I present some
sets of restrictions that may be interesting for the question that is the object of
this paper.
The first restriction is to assume transferable utility, i.e. v(x, U, t) = u(x, t)+
sU where x is a (n− 1× 1) vector.
Theorem 7. (Monotonicity): Assume transferable utility. Suppose (x, U) is
an internal political equilibrium and the Lagrangean L is supermodular in x and
satisfies the single crossing property in (x, t), i.e. Lij ≥ 0∀i 6= j and Liθ ≥ 0∀i.
Then x is weakly increasing in θ (notice the similarities with Milgrom, Shannon
1994).
Proof. See AppendixD (missing).
Theorem 7 immediately suggest the main difficulty in deriving the sign of
the comparative statics, namely how one can derive the sign of Liθand Lij , and
this is going to be the object of the next paragraph.
Assume C(x, U,R(t, θ)) =
´ t
t
c(x, t)r(t, θ)dt + U . Recall the first order con-
dition of problem (1) with respect of xi is:
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Li =
tˆ
t
vi(x, t)r(t, θ)dt− λ
tˆ
t
ci(x, t)r(t, θ)dt
Differentiate with respect to θ, which is equivalent to impose a marginal
mean preserving spread in the distribution of t(see above), to get:
Liθ =
tˆ
t
[vi(x, t)− λci(x, t)] [g(t)− f(t)] dt
Finally, integrate it by parts twice and evaluate it at θ = 0 to obtain:
Liθ(0) =
tˆ
t
[vitt(x, t)− λcitt(x, t)]
 tˆ
t
[G(s)− F (s)] ds
 dt
Notice that
´ t
t
[G(s)− F (s)] ds ≥ 0 ∀t because F (s) Second Order Stochas-
tically Dominates G(s) (see beginning of this section). Hence this implies:
sign(Liθ) = sign(vitt(x, t, n)− λcitt(x, t))
If one is interested in the comparative statics of only one specific element of x,
say xi, there are other assumptions that are sufficient for monotone comparative
statics. One interesting set of assumptions is for example additive separability
and linear budget constraint.
Define x−i as the (n− 2× 1) vector including all the elements of x but the
element xi.
Theorem 8. (Monotonicity 2): Assume the objective function is in the form
v˜(x−i, xiU, t) = a(x−i, t) +u(xi, t) + sU and the governmental budget constraint
is linear in xi. Suppose (x−i, xi, U) is an internal political equilibrium. Then x
is weakly increasing in θ if uitt(xi, t) ≥ 0 ∀xi, t.
Proof. Use equation (2) and Theorem 7. Notice that if the indirect utility is
additively separable in xi and the budget constraint is linear in xi then Lij =
0 ∀j 6= i. Transferable utility implies λ is constant at equilibrium. Hence (2)
simplifies to ∂xi(0)∂θ = −LiθLii . Now notice that Lii must be negative because of the
Second Order Condition of the maximization problem, hence sign
(
∂xi(0)
∂θ
)
=
sign(Liθ). Finally notice that additive separability and linearity of the budget
constraint in xi imply Liθ =
´ t
t
ui(x, t) [g(t)− f(t)] dt. Integrate this by parts
twice and evaluate it at θ = 0 to get Liθ(0) =
´ t
t
uitt(xi, t)
(´ t
t
[G(s)− F (s)] ds
)
dt.
Because F (s) SOSD G(s) this imply ∂xi(0)∂θ ≥ 0 if uitt(xi, t) ≥ 0 ∀xi, t. Q.E.D.
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4.2.2. Example: Public Good
Assume linear Governmental Budget constraint: C(x, Y, U,R(t, θ))) = − ´ t
t
−t+
I(x, t)r(t, θ)dt + U + PY ≤ 0 where Y is the amount of Public Good provided
by the government and x is a vector of tax and transfer variables such that the
post-tax income of an individual with gross income t is I(x, t). Assume additive
separability of indirect utility between x and Y , and transferable utility, i.e.
the indirect utility is v(x, Y, U, t) = a(x, t) + u(Y, t) + sU . Use Theorem 8 with
xi = Y to get:
sign
(
∂Y (0)
∂θ
)
= sign
 tˆ
t
uitt(xi, t)
 tˆ
t
[G(s)− F (s)] ds
 dt

Notice that this depends only on the part of the utility function in which Y
is an argument (all the redistributive elements disappeared).
Moreover, it is unaffected by the tax system chosen T (x, t). The shortcoming
is that economic theory does not give us hints about the sign of uY tt(Y, t) and
it does not seem a feature of voters’ preferences that can be easily tested. Nev-
ertheless, notice that the result depends on the third derivative uitt(xi, t) which
has small magnitude for many specifications of utility. In particular if uitt(xi, t)
is constant ∂Y (0)∂θ > 0 because
´ t
t
(´ t
t
[G(s)− F (s)] ds
)
dt = V ARG(t)−V ARF (t) >
0. Hence, differently from Downsian Models, in this model it seems unlikely to
get a strong effect of income inequality on the degree of governmental interven-
tion in Public Goods, although the result does not imply an interpretation that
is equally straightforward.
5. Non-convex Utility
This section is dedicated to model the effects of political interaction on
those private goods that because of some special features (externalities, merit
goods, etc.) are publicly provided at least to some extent in most countries.
This group includse Health Care, Education, childcare, etc. Although in most
of the examples I am not going to model explicitly the feature that induce a
positive level of provision, it is worth to keep in mind that pure private goods are
not going to be publicly provided in Probabilistic models if we allow sufficient
flexibility in the tax system. This paragraph is going to play a crucial role in
order to understand some peculiarities in the public provision of schooling that
are crucial in shaping the comparative statics.
I assume that the good is uniformly provided across individuals. About the
way in which the provision is delivered there are three main possibilities that
have been described in the literature:
1. Exclusive provision (socialization of commodities). The publicly provided
good is not available on the private market (an example is Usher, 1977).
In terms of comparative statics this case is totally equivalent to the case
of a Public Good described in section 4.
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2. Top-up good. The dimension of choice is quantitative, hence individu-
als receiving a certain level of public provision can decide to supplement
this quantity with private purchases (examples are in Epple and Romano
1996a and Gouveia, 1997). This case implies similar consequences for
comparative statics as the one of case 1 (see AppendixE, missing).
3. Opting-out good. The dimension of choice is qualitative, this meaning
that individuals can either enjoy the publicly provided good or purchase
a different level of quality on the private market (no supplementation
occurs).
This second case is particularly interesting both because it resembles the way
in which some goods are provided (e.g. education), and because they imply
additional complexity in modelling political interaction due to the non-linearity
of the governmental budget constraint and the possibility of non-convexities
in individual preferences. The effects of the opting-out assumption have been
extensively analysed in Downsian models (Epple and Romano, 1996b). In the
next section I will focus on this kind of goods in the framework of a Probabilistic
Voting model in the form of the one presented in section 4.
5.1. Opting out
Suppose that a private good is uniformly publicly provided with quality
level Q and is also available on the private market at different quality levels
{q1, q2, . . . , qN} at price Pqn (the assumption of cost of private purchase linear
in quality is a simplification that does not imply any loss of generality).
The first consequence of the opting out assumption is that the governamental
budget set cannot be linear as in the case presented in section 4. In order to
understand why this is true, consider the following way of modelling uniform
provision of an opting out good. The quality of the good provided Q is equal
to the total expenditure in the good E divided by the number of individuals
that use the public service and the price per unit of quality P . keeping the
assumptions that the consumers-voters are a continuum of size 1, this means
Q = E
P
´
1(t)g(t)dt
where 1(t) is an indicator function such that 1(t) = 1 if an
individual with income t does not opt-out, 1(t) = 0 otherwise. As the choice of
opting out is endogenous it is evident that a governmental budget constraint in
the form proposed in case 1, e.g.
´ t
t
(T (x, t) + PQ1(t)g(t)) r(t, θ)dt + U ≤ 0 it
is not generally linear.
The second consequence is that the convexity assumption of the party’s
objective function may not always be met. First of all the opting out assumption
makes the objective function more complex, for instance consider the indirect
utility of an individual with income t:
v(x, t) = max (v(x, t, n), v(x, t,m))
Wherev(x, t,m) is the indirect utility if the individual decides to opt out
and v(x, t, n) is the indirect utility of an individual that does not opt-out. This
implies that even if v(x, t, n), v(x, t,m) are C2 conacave functions, the function
v(x, t) may be neither differentiable in all the points of his domain nor concave.
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5.2. Existence and uniqueness of a political equilibrium
In order to keep the problem tractable we will assume v(x, t, n) + η(t) −
v(x, t,m) is monotone in t (A1). This assumption implies that for each vector
of policies x either v(x, t)+η(t) ≥ v(x, t, n) i.e. no opting out occurs, or v(x, t)+
η(t) ≤ v(x, t,m) i.e. all individuals opt out, or ∃tˆ(x) such that
v(x, t) =
{
v(x, t, n) if t ≥ (≤)tˆ(x)
v(x, t,m) if t < (>)tˆ(x)
This assumption simplifies the problem in such a way that we can restate
Theorems 3-6 such that the same properties hold with the In AppendixC I
provide sufficient conditions for this to hold. In the next subsection I will derive
the comparative statics induces by a marginal mean preserving spread in the
income distribution in this more complex case.
5.2.1. Comparative statics
Again, the complexity induced by the presence of an endogenous thresh-
old implies the need of further restrictions in order to derive the sign of the
comparative statics that is the object of this paper.
Assumption A2: the distribution of the variable T is decomposable into a
uniform distribution plus another distribution such that T = Z + Σ where
Z ∼ R(z, θ) and Σ ∼ Unif [, ] such that:
• + z ≥ 0 (this ensure no negative income)
•  − z − pq1 ≥ 0 (technical assumption: ensures that even an individual
with the lowest t opts-out with positive probability).
• Quasi-linear utility9: v(x,Q,U, z, , n) = I(x, z+ ) +u(Q, z+ ) + s(U) +
η(z + ).
• Private market: discrete different quality levels are available {q1, q2, . . . , qN}
at price Pqn.
v(x, U, z, ,m) = max
qi
I(x, z + − Pqi) + u(qi, z + ) + s(U)
v(x,Q,U, z, ) = max (v(x,Q, z, , n), v(x,Q, z, ,m))
Define a new threshold level ˜(x,Q, t) as:
v(x,Q,U, z, ˜, n) = v(x, U, z, ˜,m)
9The same sign for the derivative of interest can be achieved if the tax rate is linear with
quadratic utility in consumption, and transferable in a third variable U i.e. U(I, q, U, t) =
I − γI2 + u(q, t) + sU (work in progress).
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Notice that given assumption A1 this threshold, if it exists, it must be unique
given x,Q,U, z.
Result 1: the sign of the comparative statics is unaffected if we limit the
set of alternatives available on the private market to only one specific option,
namely: q¯ = arg maxqi {I(x, z + ˜)− Pqi + u(qi, z + ˜) + sU}
Proof. See AppendixF.
From now on I will assume that only one option q is available on the private
market. Denote with k the density of . The utilitarian outcome is given by:
V (x,Q, θ) =
zˆ
z
˜(z)ˆ

[I(x, z + ) + u(Q, z + )] kdr(z, θ)dz+
ˆ
˜(z)
[I(x, z + )− Pq + u(q, z + )] kdr(z, θ)dz + s(U)
Notice that the expected Social Welfare is now composed by two parts, which
corresponds to individuals that opt-out and the ones that do not.
The governmental budget constraint is also more complex in comparison
with the convex utility case because of the endogeneity of the threshold ˜(z) as
I described in section 3.1. Hence if one assumes additive budget constraint this
will be as follows:
zˆ
z
 ˆ

−t− + I(x, z + )kd+ U + PQ
˜(z)ˆ

kd
 r(z, θ)dz + U ≤ 0
Where
´ z
z
´ ˜(z)

kdr(z, θ)dz represents the share of individuals that do not
opt out. Notice that the fact that an optimum is an internal solution allows us
to substitute I(x, z + ) from the budget constraint into the objective function
(quasilinearity of the utility function does not harm the previous assumption of
strict concavity of the objective function because I(x, z+ ) does not have to be
linear). Hence the problem becomes equivalent to the unconstrained problem:
max
Q,U
zˆ
z
˜(z)ˆ

[−PQ+ u(Q, z + )] kdr(z, θ)dt+
ˆ
˜(z)
[−pq + u(q, z + )] kdr(z, θ)dz+s(U)−U+Et,(z+)
Using the same method I have shown in section 2, we need to derive the sign
of LQθ, LQU , LUθ.
LQθ =
zˆ
z
˜(z)ˆ

[−P + uq(Q, z + )] kd [g(z)− f(z)] dz =
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= −k
zˆ
z
uqt(Q, z + )
 zˆ
z
[G(s)− F (s)] ds
 dz
It is easy to show that LQU = 0, LUθ = 0 because of the additive separability
of U in the utility function. Hence the sign of the comparative statics is given
by:
sign
(
∂Q(0)
∂θ
)
= sign
− zˆ
z
uqt(Q, z + )
 zˆ
z
[G(s)− F (s)] ds
 dz

This result has a much more immediate interpretation in comparison with
the one in section 4. Namely, if u(q, t) satisfies the Single Crossing Property in
(q, t) then Q is decreasing in the degree of income inequality, while the opposite
is true if u(q, t) satisfies the Single Crossing Property in (−q, t). This just means
that in the former case individuals with relatively high income have stronger
preferences for high quality, while in the latter case ndividuals with relatively
high income have weaker preferences for high quality.
This implies that the comparative statics, as in case 2, is independent of the
tax system and of redistributive motives. Hence all that matters for the sign of
the comparative statics is how preferences towards the good of interest change
with income.
Despite of being interetsing on a theoretical point of view, this result still re-
lates the sign of the comparative statics to an unobservable feature of individual
preferences. In the next subsection I will show how under specific restrictions
this sign can be recovered from data in the case of publicly provided education.
5.2.2. Example: Education
Consider the following simplified version of the Becker-Tomes (1979) model
of intergenerational mobility, in which parental investment in children’s educa-
tion in which the parents’ (f) utility is a function of by parents’ consumption
I(x,wf ) (in which x is a vector of tax and transfers variables and wf is parental
income), public goods U and expected income of their children ws, i.e.:
U(x, q, Y, z) = I(x,wf ) + s(U) + βE
[
ws|wf ]
Suppose income w is a function of human capital of an individual i in the
form wi = w˜(Hi) + ηi and the Human capital production function of the child
Hs is a function of the quality of the education q that the child receive and of
the Human capital of the father Hf (i.e. there is a transmission mechanism of
human capital from parents to children), such that Hs = H(q,Hf ). Using these
two formulas we can derive the child’s income as a function of q, wf as follows:
ws = w˜(H(q,H(q, w˜−1
(
wf − ηf)) + ηs) = w(q, wf , ηf , ηs)
Assume ηs is independent of ηf , wf . Substituting into the utility function
we get:
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U(x, q, Y, z) = I(x,wf ) + sY + βEηs
[
w(q, wf , ηf , ηs)|wf , ηf ]
Define u(q, wf ) ≡ βEηs
[
w(q, wf , ηf , ηs)|wf , ηf ] and wf = z +  to get an
utility function in the form proposed in section 5.2.1, which implies:
sign
(
∂Q(0)
∂θ
)
= sign
− zˆ
z
uqt(Q, z + )
 zˆ
z
[G(s)− F (s)] ds
 dz

Again the sign of the comparative statics depends on the sign of uqt(·).
In this example we can calculate our derivative and derive a condition for
uqt(q, t) ≤ 0 ∀t, namely we have uqt(Q, z + ) = Hq(Q,Hf )Hh(Q,Hf ) w˜
′′(Hs)
w˜′(Hf ) +
Hqh(Q,H
f ) w˜
′(Hs)
w˜′(Hf ) which implies:
uqt(q, t) ≤ 0⇔ − w˜
′′(Hs)
w˜′(Hs)
≥ Hqh(Q,H
f )
Hq(Q,Hf )Hh(Q,Hf )
This means that the effect of an increase in income inequality on Q is going
to be weakly positive if education and parents’ human capital are not strong
complements in the human capital production function. In this example it is
perhaps more interesting to notice another result:
sign
(
∂Q(0)
∂θ
)
= sign
(
− ∂
2ws
∂q∂wf
)
which has an intuitive interpretation: an increase in the political weight of
relatively low income individuals imply a rise in the quality of public education
if a better education reduces the intensity of the transmission mechanism of
income from parents to children. This implication is potentially testable and
can be the object of future empirical research.
Notice that if the derivative ∂
2ws
∂q∂wf
is negative this implies that a stronger
public intervention in education should imply a fall in future income inequality;
on the other hand under the assumptions of section 5.2.2 the model I presented
implies that an increase in income inequality should cause an increase in public
intervention in education though the political channel. These two predictions
seem to be coherent with the facts I described in section 2, but additional
theoretical research and empirical evidence are required in order to support the
predictions that are suggested by this example.
6. Conclusions
In this paper I provide a framework that is useful to analyse the effects of
income inequality on public spending in education in democratic countries. The
theoretical foundation of this relationship is provided through the channel of
political interaction.
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This paper shows that the strong relationship between income inequality
and public intervention in public spending policies that typically emerges in
equilibrium in Downsian models is mainly a result of the restrictive assumptions
of these models and does not survive if some of these assumptions are relaxed.
I also show that these traditional models are not suitable to separate the effect
on income inequality on the extent of public intervention in a specific policy
from the effect on total redistribution, because of their excessively restrictive
assumptions. On the other hand I provide a potential theoretical explanation
to the positive relationship between income inequality and public spending in
education that is supported by some empirical literature. This explanation relies
on the particular way in which this good is publicly provided.
I propose a model of Probabilistic Voting and I develop a tool that allows
one to recover the direction of the effect of a marginal mean preserving spread in
the income distribution on the degree of public intervention in publicly provided
good with specific characteristics, and I show how the derived conditions for a
weakly positive comparative statics have an interesting interpretation if the
variable of interest is public spending in education.
The first insight of this analysis is that if voters have access to different
ways of achieving redistribution they should prefer ways of achieving their re-
distibutive target that are more efficient than in-kind policies and in particular
of publicly provided private goods. The second is that a credible way of mod-
eling the political interaction in order to study the comparative statics of the
equilibrium outcome should imply that the welfare of every single voter con-
tributes in determining the choice of the society, and this is exactly what can
be observed in the model I propose. A consequence of this result is that the
direction of the effect of an increase in income inequality on the level of public
provision of education should depend mainly on how preferences for this good
relative to consumption (and other goods) change with different level of income
for all income levels. I find that under a set of restriction on individual pref-
erence the outcome of the political process becomes completely independent of
the tax system and the comparative statics is uniquely driven by the interaction
between earning capacity and preferences for better quality of education.
Finally, I show that the sign of the comparative statics under additional
assumptions can theoretically be recovered from data.
A limit of these results is that they rely on strong assumptions about vot-
ers’ preferences and the sharp predictions I have shown would not survive if a
more flexible set of assumptions would be imposed. This suggests that further
research is required in order to achieve a clearer understanding of the determi-
nants of the relationship of interest and to be able to provide some empirical
support to the channel of causality proposed in this paper.
AppendixA. Simple Downsian Model
Consider the following simple Downsian model.
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• n voters, each of them characterized by a unidimensional parameter t ∈ T
(income).
• Two choice variables x1, x2 related by a convex governmental budget set
X such that X ≡ {(x1, x2) | (x1, x2) ∈ R2+ ∩ C(x1, x2, E(t)) ≤ 0}.
• Individual preferences: u(x1, x2, t) continuous, increasing C2 function.
• Spence-Mirrles condition: M(x1, x2, t) = ∂∂t
(
u1(x1,x2,t)
u2(x1,x2,t)
)
> (<)0∀x1, x2, t.
In equilibrium the social choice is (x1, x2) = arg max(x1,x2)∈X u(x1, x2, tm) where
tm is the median of t. Because of the Spence-Mirrles condition the preferred
choice of an individual with parameter t is such that x1 is increasing (decreas-
ing) in t and x2 is decreasing (increasing) in t. Hence the equilibrium social
choice would also change in this way if the distribution of t is changed in such
a way that the median voter has higher t and E(t) is unchanged. This implies
a monotone link between some features of the income distribution (in this case
the difference between mean and median). Q.E.D.
AppendixB. Redistribution and Income Distribution in Downsian
Models
In the model proposed in Appendix A, suppose x2is a private good that
in uniformly publicly provided (no private purchases are allowed in this sim-
ple example) and t − x1T (t) is after tax income and the utility fuction is
u(x1, x2, t) = u(t−x1T (t), x2)). Governmental budget constraint is in the form:
−x1E(T (t)) + x2 ≤ 0.
Notice that in an interior solution the budget contraint is binding hence the
problem is equivalent to:
max
x2
u(t− p(t)x2, x2)
where p(t) is the tax-price of the good defined as total amount of tax paid
divided by the size of the provision, i.e.:
p(t) =
x1T (t)
x2(t)
=
T (t)
E(T (t))
Equilibrium condition:
u1(t− p(t)x2, x2)
u2(t− p(t)x2, x2) =
1
p(t)
Demand:
∂xg2
∂t
=
p(t)u11 − u21 + p′(t) (u21x2 + u1 − p(t)u11x2)
p(t)2u11 − 2p(t)u12 + u22 =
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∂xg2
∂t
=
∂xm2
∂y
+
∂xm2
∂p
p′(t)
Using Slutsky equation:
∂xg2
∂t
=
∂xm2
∂y
(1− p′(t)x2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+
∂xh2
∂p
p′(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
This implies that:
1. If x2 is an inferior good, then both the income effect A and the tax-price
effect B are negative, hence
∂xg2
∂t < 0, i.e. if the median voter becomes a
relatively “richer” individual the level of public provision falls;
2. if the tax system is close to a lump-sum tax (i.e. p′(t) = 0) then the public
demand for public provision of the good has the same comparative statics
as the private demand.
3. even if the good is normal, the higher the marginal tax rate p′(t) the
smaller the income effect A and the larger the tax-price effect B.
4. if the tax system is progressive
(
p′(t) > 1E(t)
)
and in equilibrium a high
share of total income x2E(t) is spent in the public provision, then
∂xg2
∂t < 0
unless x2 is very income elastic (luxury).
AppendixC. Existence and Uniqueness with opting out
Endogenous discontinuity. Define
v(xi, t) = max {v(xi, n, t), v(xi,m, t)}
where v(xi, n, t), v(xi,m, t) are two different functions of xi, t.
Suppose vt(xi, n, t)−vt(xi,m, t) ≥ 0∀xi, t or vt(xi, n, t)−vt(xi,m, t) ≤ 0∀xi, t
Then there is at most one tˆ such that v(xi, n, t) = v(xi,m, t)
This implies the existence of an endogenous threshold in t such that Party
A’s objective function becomes:
V (xA, xB) =
tˆˆ
t
[P(v(xA, t, n)−v(x¯B , t))]g(t)dt+
tˆ
tˆ
[P(v(xA, t,m)−v(x¯B , t))]g(t)dt
AppendixC.1. Existence
Theorem 3b: Assume P(·) and v(x, i, t) are C2 functions in their domains.
Suppose vt(xA, t;n) − vt(xA, t;m) ≥ 0 ∀x, t. Then sufficient conditions for
existence of an equilibrium are the same as in Enelow, Hinrich (1989). Namely,
for any function v(x, t) and any distribution G(t), there is always some function
P(·) such that V (xA, xB) is concave in xA for all xA ∈ X and t ∈ T .
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Proof. Define Vjk(xA, xB) an element of the Hessian HV , i.e.
HV (j, k) ≡ Vjk(xA, xB) = ∂
2V (xA, xB)
∂xi∂xj
Denote d(xA, t, i) ≡ v(xA, t, i)−v(x¯B , t) with i ∈ {n,m}. Then (need proof!
there are things disappearing):
Vjk(xA) =
∂tˆ
∂xk
p(d(xA, tˆ))[dj(xA, tˆ;n)− dj(xA, tˆ;m)]g(tˆ)+
+
tˆˆ
t
∂2
∂xj∂xk
[P(d(xA, tˆ;n)]g(t)dt+
tˆ
tˆ
∂2
∂xj∂xk
[P(d(xA, tˆ;m)]g(t)dt
Define a matrix M(xA) such that each element is:
Mjk(xA) =
∂tˆ
∂xk
p(d(xA, tˆ, n)[dj(xA, tˆ;n)− dj(xA, tˆ;m)]g(tˆ)
And two matrixes H(i) for i = n,m such that each element is:
Hjk(i) =
∂2
∂xj∂xk
[P(d(xA, t; i)]
Recall that the sum of negative semidefinite matrixes is negative semidefinite.
Hence we need:
xTHV x ≤ 0
Using the matrixes defined above can be written as:
xTHV x = x
TM(xA)x+
tˆˆ
t
[
xTH(n)x
]
g(t)dt+
tˆ
tˆ
[
xTH(m)x
]
g(t)dt ≤ 0
Define Hv(i) ≡ D2[d(xA, t, i)] as the Hessian of individual indirect utility
and ∇d(xA, t;n) the gradient vector.
Following Enelow, Hinrich (1989) for the second and third component of
xTHV x we need:
xTH(i)x =
ˆ
T (i)
(
p′(d(xA, t))xT [∇d(xA, t; i)] [∇d(xA, t; i)]T x+ p(d(xA, t))xTHv(i)x
)
g(t)dt ≤ 0
Notice that as F becomes close to uniform this condition is equivalent to
the matrix Hv(i) to be negative semidefinite, which is equivalent to a concave
utility function. But in comparison with Enelow, Hinrich (1989) we have an
additional element: M(xA).
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Consider the definition of tˆ(xA):
d(xA, tˆ;m) = d(xA, tˆ;n)
Differentiate this w.r.t. xk and rearrange to get:
∂tˆ
∂xk
= −dk(xA, tˆ;m)− dk(xA, tˆ;n)
dt(xA, tˆ;m)− dt(xA, tˆ;n)
Substituting into Mjk(xA) we get:
Mjk(xA) = −p(d(xA, tˆ, n)) [dj(xA, tˆ;n)− dj(xA, tˆ;m)][dk(xA, tˆ;n)− dk(xA, tˆ;m)]
dt(xA, tˆ;n)− dt(xA, tˆ;m)
g(tˆ)
Hence
M(xA) = − f(d(xA, tˆ, n))
dt(xA, tˆ;n)− dt(xA, tˆ;m)
[∇d(xA, tˆ;n)−∇d(xA, tˆ;m)] [∇d(xA, tˆ;n)−∇d(xA, tˆ;m)]T g(tˆ)
Given that
[∇d(xA, tˆ;n)−∇d(xA, tˆ;m)] [∇d(xA, tˆ;n)−∇d(xA, tˆ;m)]T is the
product of the same vector it is positive semidefinite, hence a sufficient condition
for xTM(xA)x ≤ 0 for all x is:
dt(xA, tˆ;n)− dt(xA, tˆ;m) > 0
Notice that this condition corrisponds roughly to SDI in Epple and Romano
(1996) in the case of opting out (explain).
Hence the conditions for existence of a Political Equilibrium are the same as
in Enelow, Hinrich (1989), plus the additional condition stated above.
Overall, the restrictiveness of this additional requirement depends on the
specific application chosen (see section...)
On the other hand, it is possible that even if dt(xA, tˆ;n)−dt(xA, tˆ;m) < 0 the
second and the third elements of Vjk(xA) are sufficient to guarantee concavity
of the whole function.
AppendixC.2. Uniqueness
Theorem 4b: Assume (i) X is compact and convex, (ii) for each t and C,
PC(xA, xB , t) is jointly continuous in (xA, xB), (iii) for each (xA, xB),
´
PA(xA, xB)g(t)dt
is strictly concave in xA and
´
PB(xA, xB , t)g(t)dt is strictly concave in xB.
Then there is exactly one electoral equilibrium, and it is in pure strategies.
(i) Compactness. Same as in Theorem 3. Convexity. In out problem is
satisfied if and only if the Governmental Budget set C(x,G(t)) ≤ 0 is a convex
set. In problems with non-linear budget sets this conditions may fail to apply
(see next sections).
(ii) Joint continuity. Same as in Theorem 1.
(iii) Strict concavity. Conditions are the same as in Theorem 3, except that
we need to verify the negative dfinitiveness of the Hessian Matrix.
AppendixC.3 Policy convergence 24
AppendixC.3. Policy convergence
Theorem 5b (policy convergence): under assumptions (i), (ii), (iii) of The-
orem 4, the unique electoral equilibrium is such that the two parties choose the
same policy.
Proof. Notice that the game described above can be modelled as a zero sum
game because the expected plurality for Party B: is equal to 1− V (xA, xB)
Suppose (xA, xB) is an equilibrium strategy and xA 6= xB and V (xA, xB) =
k. Each Party i can always achieve a certain value V i by playing xi = x−i.
Hence if k < V A (a) then xA cannot be a best response for Party A because
it can profitably deviate to xA = xB . If k > V A (b), then V (xB , xA) =
1−V (xA, xB) = 1−k. Then xB cannot be a best response for Party B because it
can deviate to xB = xA and get V B = 1−V A and (b) implies that this deviation
is profitable. Hence in equilibrium it must be true that V (xA, xB) = V A and
V (xB , xA) = V B . Given that the function V (xA, xB) is strictly concave in xA
the problem
max
x∈X
V (x, xB)
has got a unique solution, hence it must be the case that in equilibrium
xA = xB .
AppendixC.4. Utilitarian outcome
Theorem 6b (utilitarian outcome): if all individuals have the same Party
preference distribution, i.e. P(d, t) = P(d)∀t then the policy chosen by both
parties in equilibrium is the same as the policy that would be chosen by an
omnipotent Benthamite governemt.
Proof. Lagrangean for this problem is:
tˆˆ
t
[P(v(xA, t, n)−v(x¯B , t))]g(t)dt+
tˆ
tˆ
[P(v(xA, t,m)−v(x¯B , t))]g(t)dt−λ [C(x,G(t))]
First order conditions.
[xi] :
tˆˆ
t
p [d(xA, t, n)] vi(x
A, t, n)g(t)dt+
tˆ
tˆ
p [d(xA, t,m)] vi(xA, t,m)g(t)dt = λ [Ci(x,G(t))]
Hence forany i, j:
´ tˆ
t
p [d(xA, t, n)] vi(x
A, t, n)g(t)dt+
´ t
tˆ
p [d(xA, t,m)] vi(xA, t,m)g(t)dt´ tˆ
t
p [d(xA, t, n)] vj(xA, t, n)g(t)dt+
´ t
tˆ
p [d(xA, t,m)] vj(xA, t,m)g(t)dt
=
Ci(x,G(t))
Cj(x,G(t))
Notice that at an equilibrium point xA = xB (see above) hence d(xA, t, n) =
d(xA, t,m) = 0∀t and tˆ(xA) = tˆ(xB).
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Given that p(d(xA, t, i)) is independent of t in this case, i.e. p(d(xA, t, i)) =
p(0), then the previous equaltion becomes:
´ tˆ
t
vi(x
A, t, n)g(t)dt+
´ t
tˆ
vi(xA, t,m)g(t)dt´ tˆ
t
vj(xA, t, n)g(t)dt+
´ t
tˆ
vj(xA, t,m)g(t)dt
=
Ci(x,G(t))
Cj(x,G(t))
which is the same condition that we would find for the problem:
max
C(x,G(t))≤0
tˆˆ
t
v(x, t, n)g(t)dt+
tˆ
tˆ
v(x, t,m)g(t)dt
Which is the Utilitarian Social Optimum. Notice that this result does not
hold if individuals with different t have different Party preference distributions.
AppendixD. TBC
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AppendixF. Multiple Options in the Private Market
Suppose there are other options available on the private market that are cho-
sen with positive probability at an equilibrium. Define new thresholds ˜i(x,Q, z)
such that
I(x, z+ ˜i)−Pqi +u(qi, z+ ˜i) + sU = I(x, z+ ˜i)−Pqi+1 +u(qi+1, z+ ˜) + sU
then the objective function becomes
V˜ (x,Q, θ) =
zˆ
z
˜(z)ˆ

[−PQ+ u(Q, z + )] kdr(z, θ)dz+
n−1∑
i=1
˜i+1(z)ˆ
˜i(z)
[−Pqi + u(qi, z + )] kdr(z, θ)dz+
+
ˆ
˜i(z)
[−Pqi + u(qi, z + )] kdr(z, θ)dz + (s− 1)U + Et,(z + )
Then
L˜Qθ =
tˆ
t
˜1(z)ˆ

[−P + uq(Q, z + )] kd [g(z)− f(z)] dz = −
zˆ
z
uqt(Q, z+)s(z)dz = LQθ
Hence the comparative statics is not affected by reducing the range of options
on the private market to one single quality level as long as the level chosen is
such that ∃˜(z) such that −Pq+ u(qi, z+ ˜) = u(Q, z+ ˜) for some z ∈ (z, z) in
the proximity of the political equilibrium. Q.E.D.
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